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NOTES
1. Pereboom assumes throughout the work that there are various types of
freedom, and specifies what type of freedom he is discussing in various contexts.
2. See John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will: All Essay 011 Control
(Cambridge Mass Blackwell Publishers, 1994), pp. 140-141, "Recent Work on
Moral Responsibility," Ethics, vol. 110 (1999), pp. 93-139, and in Fischer and
Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control, (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), pp. 100ff.
3. The arguments he considers are largely from Jaegwon Kim,
Supervenience and Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Searching for an Adequate God: A Dialogue between Process and Free Will
Theists by John B. Cobb JI. and Clark H. PilIDock, eds. Grand Rapids,
Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000. $26.00.
LEWIS S. FORD, Old Dominion University
Process theists follow Whitehead in requiring that their theology be adequate in the sense that every item of experience, including the findings of
science, can be interpreted in terms of their philosophy. Free-will theists
have a rather different notion of adequacy in mind: it must be adequate to
Scripture as broadly interpreted within the evangelical tradition.
Although starting from such diverse perspectives, they have much in
common. In particular both endorse what is known as "open theism," that
God does not know future contingents, not because there is some peculiar
limit on divine omniscience, but because future contingents are simply
unknowable per se. God knows the actual as actual, the possible as possible, but not the possible future as if it were already in some sense determinately actual.
Traditional treatments of omniscience attempt to preserve immutability.
God's knowledge could only be immutable if it were already completely
determinate. Such traditional accounts assume that God must be complete
and fully self-sufficient to be perfect. That is the proper meaning for a perfect being. Process theism sees God as becoming, and therefore adopts a
different standard of perfection: that which, no matter how great, can
always be further enriched. Open theists recognize the extent to which
God is portrayed as temporally engaged, facing an indeterminate future.
David Griffin and William Hasker, whose contributions frame the volume, explore the differences. One concerns creation ex nihilo. This is not in
the first instance the cosmological question about the beginning of the
world, although process theists need to take more seriously than they have
the claim by astrophysicists that time and the world began with the Big
Bang. It is more the question whether God can be complete and self-sufficient alone, or whether God requires some sort of world as a source of novelty and enrichment. It also concerns divine power, as pure persuasion
does not appear able to explain creation ex nihilo.
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For process thinldng God requires a world to love, whereas open theists
find Jove already within a social trinity, and insist that the existence of the
world is contingent upon a divine decision. For them this expresses the
transcendence of a necessary God over a contingent world. If, however,
perfection needs enrichment, there must be an other to provide that enrichment. A social trinity may provide a home for love, but after some aeons
wouldn't the personae become bored with one another? Adventure, the
quest for new perfections, is a metaphysical excellence for process theism
appropriate for God, not just an accidental appendage.
Hartshorne and Griffin hold that metaphysical principles, e.g. that some
world or other exists, are beyond divine determination. Whitehead, however, held that God "at once exemplifies and establishes the categoreal conditions." If so, God could choose a purely deterministic world, although it
would make little sense, there being no way it could provide God with any
novelty. It would be no better than a world God could fully imagine, or no
world at all. In determining the metaphysical principles for our world, God
could agree to live by those principles in dealing with our world. This is the
truth in the kenotic view proposed by Rice (p. 188ff). In some such fashion
it seems possible to mediate between process and open theists on this issue.
Rice, who pioneered open theism in 1980, situates it between classical
theism and process theism persuasion. Classical theists typically understand omnipotence in terms of unilateral power. Open theists argue that
God acts sometimes coercively (as in creation or miracles) God usually acts
persuasively, respecting creaturely freedom. Process theists insist that God
acts only persuasively.
David Basinger alleges an inconsistency in Divine Power in Process
Theism (reviewed in Faith and Philosophy 8/1 (January 1991), 124-27). On
the one hand, process theology claims persuasive power is superior to
coercive power, yet on the other hand it holds that "God is morally culpable if he has coercive power but fails to use it ... if there are times when
God should employ coercive power, how can its exercise be inherently
immoral?" (p. 193).
We should not restrict ourselves to persuasion versus coercion. There is
a prior issue involved. Is God's activity part of the regular course of
things, so that it is exercised in all events? Or can there be supernatural
interruptions? Process theism has sought to conceive of God's activity as
purely regular. In such a context divine power must be persuasive, if there
is to be any freedom.
Open theism is proud of the fact that it allows for both persuasive and
coercive divine power. ("Coercive power" is misleading. We should talk
in terms of determinative power, as Hasker suggests. God's power in creating the world is hardly coercive, since there did not as yet exist anything,
which could be coerced.) But any special determinative act introduces an
element of supernatural intervention, for otherwise events can be considered to be influenced by past events, divine persuasion, and self-determination.
If divine activity is natural and continuous, then it must be persuasive.
If divine activity is occasionally determinative, then determinative acts
should happen more often than they do to prevent egregious evil. Even if
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this were to curtail some freedom and soul making, it would be worth it.
While process and open theism largely agree on temporalistic omniscience,
they part company, as we have seen, with respect to divine power.
Although appreciating divine persuasion, open theists insist upon omnipotence as the norm, even if it is self-limited in most cases. Besides Hasker
and Griffin, who debate the major differences, Rice, Howell, and Wheeler
take up more mediating positions.
Wheeler in particular explores what elements an evangelical can learn
from process theism. His finely nuanced essay suggests further ways in
which the discussion may be taken. He presents the evangelical position in
terms of National Association of Evangelicals 1942 statement of faith (p.
111), and explores its ramifications in terms of process theism, including
the question of Biblical authority. He indicates other areas such as the
Body of Christ, the earth community, and eschatology where dialogue
could be especially fruitful.

Finite and Infinite Goods, by Robert Adams. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1999. Pp. 424. $45.00 (hardcover).
TIMOTHY CHAPPELL, Department of Philosophy, University of Dundee,
Dundee, Scotland. t.d.j.chappell@dundee.ac.uk
This remarkable book is a milestone in ethics and in philosophy of religion. Directly, it is the fruit of thought and reflection on ethics over at least
ten years- from Robert Adams' Wilde Lectures in Oxford in 1989, to its
publication in 1999. Equally but less directly, it represents, co-ordinates
and systematises Adams' writings on ethics over the whole of the last
quarter-century. Those who know Adams' distinguished work at the cutting edge of analytical philosophy of religion will come to this book with
high expectations. I believe they will not be disappointed. Anyone who
thinks that there is nothing new in philosophy of religion, or that secularminded ethicists need know no more about theistic ethics than the
Euthyphro Dilemma, had better think again.
If I were requested to sum up Finite and Infinite Goods in a single soundbite, I think the sound-bite would have to be "generosity of intellect and
imagination". One of Adams' chief gifts is his Bach-like ability to take a
simple theme and show how much can be done with it: how widely and
how differently different variations on that theme can be applied and reapplied. It is this intellectual generosity and imagination that holds together
what would otherwise be an unwieldy and inchoate variety collection. The
book is vast in. its ambition and its scope, covering everything from the
semantics and metaphysics of value to eros, idolatry and martyrdom. It is
only Adams' exceptional ability to keep a grip on his "big picture" that
enables him to tell a coherent story about so many different regions of our
life and thought.
The book is divided into four sections. Part I, "The Nature of the Good,"

